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lJNIVERSITY UTAH 
NO'! } 1957 
IN THE SUPREME COUIR'W LiCRAR'i 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KARL R. LYMAN and 
EDITH K. LYMAN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
! LED 
l r ll 1 6 1057 '.) u !..._ :J 
vs ········· ·····--·-············-····-····· 
NATIONAL MORTGAGE BOND Clerk, Supreme c~~rl."""i.it~h----.. 
CORPORATION, a corporation 
of the State of Delaware, 
AMALIA V. YBARRA, person-
ally; 
AMALIA V. YBARRA, as Ad-
ministratrix of the Estate of To- Civil No. 8633 
mas Velarde, Deceased ; 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of the State 
of Utah, and all other persons un-
known claiming right, title, estate 
or interest in or lien upon the real 
property described in the com-
plaint adverse to Plaintiffs' own-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The land in question claimed by the appellants 
is situated in San Juan County, Utah, and is ac-
curately described in appellants' brief at page 4. 
The land was patented on June 13, 1922. The paten-
tee, Tomas Velarde, after receiving the patent on 
the ground in 1922 failed to pay taxes to San Juan 
County. As a result the land was sold to San Juan 
County on March 25, 1927, by an Auditor's Tax 
Deed. In 1941 J. M. Bailey, predecessor in title 
and interest of plaintiffs and respondents herein, 
purchased the land from San Juan County, and a 
Tax Deed was issued by San Juan County to J. N. 
Bailey on December 12, 1941. Since that date the 
plaintiffs and their predecessors in title and inter-
est have been in exclusive and ope11 possession of 
the land and have cultivated the land, planted crops 
thereo11, harvested the same, used the land for graz-
ing purposes and broke up ground and improved 
the same which was adapted to cultivation and en-
closed the la11d with a substantial fence. From 1941 
to date plaintiffs a11d their predecessors in title and 
interest haYc paid or redeemed all of the taxes as-
sessed against tl1e property. As stated in appel-
lants' brief there are no 4 consecutive years where 
the property taxes were paid before the~r became 
delinquent, but tl1e taxes that ,yere allowed to go 
delinque11t were al,vay·s redee111ed before there was 
an~y Ma~y sale COllYe)'"iilg tl1e 11roperty· to San Juan 
Co11nty. 
The appellants asserted or <"lai111ed no possession 
from 1927 when the Auditor's Tax Deed 'vas issued 
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conveying the property to San Juan County. Tomas 
Velarde and his heirs have paid no taxes on the 
property since it was patented in 1922. Plaintiffs 
then filed this quiet title action and after a period 
of 29 years from the date the Auditor's Tax Deed 
was issued the appellant then comes into Court and 
asserts title in behalf of herself and as the Admin-
istratrix of her father's estate. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
In connection with the appeal the appellants 
have argued their case under 3 separate points. For 
the purpose of replying to the argument of appel-
lants respo11dents will ansvver each of appellant's 
points and then submit argument supporting the 
respondent's points which are as follows: 
1. Defendants are barred from asserting any 
right, title or interest to the land or from setting up 
any defense to plaintiff's complaint by the 4 year 
statute of limitations where the property is acquired 
under tax title. 
2. Defendants are barred from asserting any 
right, title or interest to the land or from setting 
up any defense to plaintiff's complaint by the gen-
eral 7 year statute of limitations. 
3. Plai11tiffs have a valid title to the property 
under the 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles 
plus exclusive possession during this period and the 
payment of taxes during the 4 year period. 
ANSWER TO .APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT 
Defendants' point No. 1 is that ''payment of 
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taxes each year for the statutory period before they 
become delinquent is necessary to establish title by 
.adverse possession.'' In answer to this point plain-
tiffs recognize that the Utah case of Bowen vs. Olsen, 
268 P. 2d 983, 2 U (2d) 12, holds that redemption 
of taxes is not equivilant to the payment of taxes 
before they become delinquent and that this case is 
·against plaintiff's contention on this point. The 
Bowen vs. Olsen case, however, was decided in 1954 
construing the law as it applied lrnder the old Sec-
tion 104-2-12 UCA 1943. This section now has been 
amended and is now Section 78-12-12 U CA 1953. 
The amendment was made in the 1951 session laws 
Chapter 19. In this amendment an additional pro-
viso was enacted providing for sitllations where 
the property was acquired under a tax title. The 
wording in this proviso added by this amendment is 
slightly different fro1n the wordll1g of the old sec-
tion which was amended and the Bowen vs. Olsen 
case is not necessarily controling where there has 
been adverse possession and payme11t of taxes since 
the amendment of this particular section. Additional 
argument will be presented in cliscllssing pla.i11tiffs' 
poi11t No. 3 later on i11 this Brief. 
As point No. 2 defendants elain1 "The plain-
tiffs still have the bl1rrle11 of provi11g a.ll elements 
of adverse possessio11 despite the 1951 ailleildil1ents 
to tl1e stat11te relating to li1nitatio11 of a~__·tiol1S." The 
11ew Sectio11s enac-ted i11 Cha l)ter 19.. 1951 session 
laws whieh are now Seetions 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 
UCA 1953 as they r0late to titles aeq11ired 11nder tax 
sale were <'naeted speeifieall~~ to elin1inate tl1e llrob-
lelns ariRiug nndrr the old statutes i11 lllJl1oldi11g tax 
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deeds. These new sections are both statutes of lim-
itation which prevent the imposing of a defense or 
asserting the right to real property by the original 
owner against someone that holds under a tax title .. 
Under these 2 sections enacted in 1951 it is not 11ow 
necessary for the holder of a tax title to sl1ow all of 
the elements of adverse possession in order to de-
feat the title of the original ow11er and his st1ceessors 
in interest before the land was sold to the Oountv 
OJ 
for nonpayme11t of taxes. Tl1is point will be further 
discussed by plaintiffs in their arguments support-
ing points 1 and 2. 
Under point 2 defenda11ts claim that the plain-
tiffs should have pleaded the statute of limitations 
or had the san1e covered in a pre-trial order. As 
pointed ot1t by the Utah Stlpreme Court i11 Hanse11 
vs. Morris 283 P. 2d 884, 3 U (2d) 310, under r11le 
7(a) the plaintiff has no authorized pleading tlnder 
this rule to set up the statute of limitations. De-
fenda11t did not file a counterclai1n or a cross coin-
plaint and her answer completed the pleadings al-
lowed under this rule. The sitt1atio11 in the instant 
case is the same as in tl1e Hansen vs. Morris case 
wherein this Court held that the plaintiffs did 11ot 
have to affirmatively plead the statute of limitations 
in order to claim the benefits of this statute. 
Defendant also mentions under point No.2 tl1at 
there is a presumption of possession in tl1e legal 
title holder. This presumption is rebutted by direet 
evidence at the trial that the plaintiffs and their 
}Jredecessors in interest and title had actually oe-
cupied, grazed, c·ultivated, planted, farmed a11d har-
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vested crops froin tl1is particular land si11ce 1941 
when the property was conveyed to J. N. Bailey by 
San Juan County. 
Defendant claims as Point No. 3 ''There is no 
proof that tl1e plaintiffs are 'holders of a tax title' 
within the meaning of the statute." The deed from 
San Juan County to J. N. Bailey which is dated De-
cember 12, 1941, a11d appears at page of the 
abstract of title is certainly a tax title as defined 
i11 Section 78-12-5.3 UCA 1953, which sectio11 was 
e11aeted under Chapter 19 of the 1951 sessio11 laws. 
r_rhis conveya11ce from San J ua11 County comes with-
in the provisions of this Section which states that 
a tax title includes any title whether valid or dt>-
rived through or dependant upon any sale, conve~T­
ance of transfer of such property in the cotlrse of a 
statutory proceeding for the liq11idation of any ta~~ 
levied against st1ch property "\vhereby the property 
is released from a tax lien. The tax deed from Sa11 
Juan County recites tl1at the pro1Jert~T \vas received 
py the County for 11011payment of taxes and recites 
that a11 Auditor's Tax Deed \vas issued eonve}ing 
the property to San Juan County a11d the Deed fron1 
the County to J. N. Bailey was a further tra11sfer 
of the property whirh relieved the la11d i11 q11estion 
from the orginal tax lien. Tl1e reql1ire111e11ts set 
forth in this Sectio11 etre met b~T a11 .. A .. uditor's Tax 
Deed or a Deed at the ~ra~T sale or a Deed fro1n the 
Connty to a JHlrr baser after th8 1\ Ia:T sale. 
As conclusio11s defendants ask that the lo\ver 
Co11rt be reversed a n rl tl1a t a Deer('le he (~lltere'l 
a.~·ainst the plaintiffs in fayor of tl1e {teft=•n(iant~ 
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and appellants herein adjt1dgi11g and decreeing that 
defendants are the owners in fee simple of the land 
involved in the Stlit. In this demand defe11dants ex-
ceed the prayer of their complaint. In the prayer 
of their complaint defendants do not ask for any 
affirmative relief but only ask that the plaintiffs 
take nothing by their Complaint. Defendants only 
filed an Answer, and there is no Counter Clain1 or 
Cross Complaint. Defendants are, therefore, 11ot 
entitled to any affirmative relief, a11d there should 
be no Decree quieting title in the defendants, even 
if the court found that plaintiffs were not entitled 
to have title quieted i11 the1n. The most that could 
be do11e wot1ld be to send the case bacl{ for new trial 
or to set aside the Findings and Decree Qt1ieting 
Title in the Plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
POINTS 
POINT 1 
DEFENDANTS ARE BARRED FROlVI AS-
SERTING ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST 
TO THE LAND OR FROM SETTING UP ANY 
DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT BY 
THE 4 YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
WHERE THE PROPERrry IS ACQUIRED UN-
DER TAX TITLE. 
Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, UCA, 1953, 
set up the 4 year statute of limitations agai11st tl1e 
original owner where property has been acqt1ired 
under tax title and is held and possessed by tl1e Ile\v 
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tax title purchaser. These two sections were former-
ly Sections 104-2-5 and 104-2-5.10 of the 1943 code 
as a1nended and enacted by Chapter 19 of the 1951 
session laws. Section 78-12-5.3, UCA, 1953, which 
was formerly Section 104-2-5.11 of the 1943 code en-
acted by Chapter 19 of the 1951 session laws defines 
what is a tax title. In order to come within this 
definition the tax title does not have to be valid. 
In the words of this section it states ''Whether 
valid or not. '' The tax ti tie under these 3 sections 
quoted in this paragraph originated by the Auditor's 
Tax Deed issued to San Juan Collnty in 1927. This 
Auditor's Tax Deed by its very terms is one of the 
instruments issued wl1ere the original owner has 
failed to pay the taxes and they have gone delin-
qllei1t for a period of 4 years ~fter which time the 
County was authorized to isslle a:n Auditor's _Tax 
Deed co11Ve?i11g the property to San Jua11 County. 
The Tax Deed from San Juan County to J. N. 
Bailey, dated December 12, 1941, is another instru-
lnent "\\7hich transfers a tax title withi11 the n1ean-
ing· of that tern1 in the sections hereinabove quoted. 
l~l1is Tax Deed from San Juan Count~~ recites that 
the taxes were delinqllent, the~~ \Yel·e not redee111ed 
and that an Auditor's Tax Deed was isslled and 
that this particular tax title deed fron1 Sa11 Juan 
County was issued by· reaso11 thereof. Plai11tiffs and 
their predecessors i11 title a11d i11terest l1ave bee11 in 
actual possessio11 of th~ la11d si11ee December 12~ 
1941, a11d l1ave occupied, far111ed and grazed tl1e aren 
eo11tinually sinee tl1en. Defenda11ts l1aYe 11ot been 
in I)OSsession of the~ ] and sinre prior to 1927 and 
rnake no <·lain:l that they· \Vere. 
10 
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The lower Court fot111d that plaintiffs' title was 
derived froin a tax title more than 4 years prior to 
bringing this action and that plaintiffs and their 
predecessors have been in possession to the exclll-
sion of defendants since 1941. There is an abunda11ce 
of evidence to support the findings by tl1e trial cot1rt 
to bring tl1e case u11der these t\NO statutes of lirnita-
tion and the trial cot1rt should be instructed tl1erei11. 
. .As pointed out previously in this Brief tl1ese 
two sections are strictly statutes of limitation and by 
their terms prevent a plai11tiff from asserting a clai111 
or a defendant frorn asserti11g a defe11se "\Yl1ere s1rcl1 
plaintiff or defendant has not been in possessio11 of 
the property withi11 a period of 4 years after tl1e 
land has been acquired under a tax title hy another 
party. These two sectio11s, now 78-12-5.1 a11d 78-12-
5.2, UCA, 1953, say no_thing of the payme11t of taxes 
and do not require the payment of taxes as 011e of 
the conditions under which the statutes could be im-
posed as a statt1te of li111itatio11S to preve11t the as-
serting of a claim or defense to the recovery or pos-
session of real pro1)er(y. 
The fact sit-uation in the instant case squarely 
comes within the provisions of tl1e fact situatior1 as 
set forth in Hansen vs. Morris, 283 P 2d 884, 3 U 
(2d) 310, herein before quoted wherein this court 
upheld the constitutionality of these 2 sectio11s re-
lied upon by plaintiffs and stated that they were 
enacted as statutes of li1nitatio11s and for the sperifie 
pu.rpose to prevent the raising of defenses in tax 
title cases based on failure to comply v1ith the statua-
tory stel)S leading to the issuance of the tax deeds. 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In referring to these two sections the court states: 
''Another effort to provide a statute of 
limitations designed to validate tax titles was 
made by passage of Chapter 19, 104-2, Laws of 
Utah 1951, 78-12-5.2, U.C.A. 1953, Pocket Sup-
plement, the two sections of which are alone im-
portant so far as this case is concerned a11cl 
which read as follows: . . . '' 
''It appears obvious that such sections 
were enacted to eliminate the objections pointed 
out in the Toronto case, and were intended to 
prevent raising of defenses based on failure 
to comply with statutory steps leading down 
the long road traversable in perfecting tax titles, 
unless 01~e cla1:ming a better title, assert his 
rights within four years after a document of 
transfer, valid on its face, has been executed 
and delivered 'in the course of a statutory pro-
ceeding for the liquidation of a.ny tax levied 
against *** property whereby the property is 
relieved from a tax lien.' '' 
(Emphasis added) 
POINT 2 
DEFENDANTS ARE BAR.R.ED FRO~I AS-
C:ERTAINING ANY RIGHT~ TITLE OR IX-
'eEREST TO THE LAND OR FR.OM SETTING 
UP ANY DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFFS' CO:i\I-
PLAINT BY THE GENER.AL 7 YEAR. ST.A_-
TUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
These sa1ne sectio11s me11tio11ed abo,~e~ 78-12-5.1 
a11d 78-12-5.2~ U01\~ 195~1~ g:iv~ a g·e11era.l statntlJ of 
limitation~ for a 7 y(•ar l)~riod and tl1e 7 ytJar fea-
tn r<~ of thP ~anH\ Rtn tn tes also bn rs tl1e defe11dants 
fro1n aRRPrtbtg· tlH•ir elai1u in this aetio11. Plaintiffs 
12 
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have been in possession a11d more than 7 years has 
expired since the Tax Deed was issued to the plai11-
tiffs in 1941. The argument supporting plai11tiffs' 
point No. 1 is also applicable to this 7 year statute 
of limitations. The only difference betvveen tl1e 2 
provisions of the said statutes is the lJeriod of time. 
POINT 3 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE A VALID TITLE rl"'O 
THE PROPERTY UNDER THE 4 YEAR ST.f:L-
TUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON TAX TITI_jE 
PLUS EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION DURING 
'l1HIS PERIOD AND THE PAYNIENT OF 
TAXES DURING THE 4 YEAR PERIOD. 
In addition to the defendant being barred by 
the 4 year statute of li1nitations on tax titles and 
the general 7 year statute of limitations, both dis-
cussed a b o v e, in plaintiffs' points Nos. 1 and 2, 
plaintiffs have initiated a new and valid title by be-
ing in open, 11otoriot1s and adverse possession of 
said property since 1941 and paying the taxes for 
more than 4 years. 
As previously stated in this Brief in a11swer t\' 
defendants' argument since 1941 the plai11tiffs a11d 
their predecessors in title and interest have paid all 
the taxes before the due date for each year or re-
deemed them before the iviay sale for each and every 
year since the property was purchased from San 
~T uan County. The questio11 of whether the reden1p-
tion of taxes dt1ring the redemption period is snf-
fitient to comply vv-ith the requirements of the sta-
tute of limitations was prPvion:~ly disclisscd h~:.'" thiR 
1•) , ) 
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Court in Bowe11 vs. Olsen, supra. In that case the 
Court recognizes that there is a division of authority 
among the different jurisdictions. The Supreme 
Court of Utah adopted the majority view that re-
demption of taxes is not equivalent to the payment of 
taxes before delinquent and is not sufficient to com-
ply with the statute of limitations on adverse pos-
session. Since this case was decided in 1954 other 
jurisd1ctions have considered the matter and the 
latest annotation in ALR is found in 50 ALR 2d 
592 wherein is annotated a Virginia case of Thomas 
vs. Young 196 Virginia 1166, 87 SE 2d 127. In this 
case the Virginia Supreme Court held that redemp-
tion of taxes was sufficient to comply· with the re-
quirements of the adverse possession statutes and 
the Court held that a forfeiture of lien to the com-
ID011Wealth for nonpayment of taxes, being intended 
merely to create an i11defeasible lien for· their col-
lectioi1, does not eo11stitute a break in the required 
continuity of adverse possession. Following this 
case at Note 5 u11der the heading "Adverse Posses-
siol1 Held 11ot Interrupted" are a11notated cases 
from the States of Massachusetts, Texas~ :Jiississippi 
and lVIinnesota as all Sllpporting this view. 
We respectfully· submit that the reasoning of 
the Virginia, California, ~Iontana and other Courts 
holding that redemption does not interrupt the run-
Jling of the statt1te is the better Yie\\... The reasons 
given under the majority· a11d I11i11ority view are 
fully discussed i11 the argun1ent of the Bowe11 YS. 
Olse11 case, a11d it wo11ld be superfltlOllS to add to 
that at this time Qxeept to point Ollt that fro111 a 
14 
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practical standpoint a land ovvner who has the rec-
ord title of land in his name does not lose his land 
or any rights to it by allowing the taxes to become 
deli11quent and redeeming them before the 1\tlay sale. 
The very purpose of redemption is to allow a period 
of time for the owner to pay his taxes where econo1nic 
difficulties prevent him from paying them the Cllr-
rent year before they become delinquent. I11 re-
deeming he pays all the taxes that have been assessed 
plus the penalty and interest that is added to the 
original amou11t because they vvere not paid on the 
dl1e date. If the land owner chooses to pa~r the 
taxes after the current year and pay tl1e penalty and 
interest he should not thereby be jeopardized in his 
ownership of the land. The tax sale to the County 
on January 10 following the due date of November 
30 does not divest title from the orginal o"\vner bllt 
is as the term implies a preliminary tax sale whicl1 
gives the County a lien for the collectio11 of the taxes 
due. There is no cha11ge in ownership of the land, 110 
change in possession and we submit there, therefore, 
should be no break in the required continuity for 
adverse possession where payment of taxes is re-
quired. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the 
Court should reconsider the position taken in the 
Bowen vs. Olsen case and that the jllrisdictions l1old-
ing that redemption of taxes does not constit11te a 
breal{ in the required continuity for adverse pos-
session is the better reasoned vievv. 
The trial court, therefore, properly fot1nd that 
plaintiffs' title had been pllrchased from Sa11 Juan 
County by tax deed i11 1941, tl1at this title was a tax 
15 
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title, that plaintiffs had been in open, notorious and 
adverse possession of the property continuously since 
1941 and had paid all taxes on the propery since 
1941 and that defendants had not been in possession 
during this period of time. Pursuant to the Find-
ings the Court properly declared that the plaintiffs 
were the onwers of this property. There is a1npJe 
evidence to support the Court findings as detailed 
above. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Defendant is barred from asserting any de-
fense to plaintiffs' complaint or from asserting any 
right, title or interest in said pro}Jerty by reason of 
the 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles and 
also by reason of the general 7 year statute of limi-
tations. 
2. Plaintiff has established a good a11d valid 
title by adverse possession and pa~rment of taxes 
under tl1e 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles. 
3. There was ample evidence to support plain-
tiffs' findings and the trial co11rt 's fi11di11gs and de-
cree sho11ld he sustai11ed . 
. 4. Even if the lower co11rt is 11ot sustai11ed, the 
ea~P sl1011ld be re1nanded bacl{ for furtl1er proceed-
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ings for a new trial and for proceedings in accord-
ance with Section 59-10-65, UCA, 1953. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANDSEN AND KELLER 
By Duane A. Frandsen 
72 West Main 
Price, Utah 
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